

# Abusing Bleeding Edge Web Standards for AppSec Glory

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@TheRyanLester

# @eganist

- Does AppSec stuff, usually.
- Mentors security startups, sometimes.
- “Mentors” others on AppSec, occasionally.
- Paid a buck to make Steve Ballmer dance, but just once.

# @TheRyanLester

- Runs an E2EE communication startup
- Codes for an E2EE communication startup
- Ran QA automation at a rocket factory
- Got sued by Napster (and not for piracy)

# Bleeding Edge Web Standards

For Your (Ab)use, we'll talk about these:


- SubResource Integrity  
**SRI Fallback**

- Content Security Policy  
**CSP Meta-Hardening**

- HTTP Public Key Pinning  
**HPKP Suicide**

# But Why?

- New standards are frequently drafted.
- Many introduce unforeseen complications.
- Novel uses encourage future tweaks.



Source: Harold & Kumar Go to White Castle

# SubResource Integrity

- Validate resources beyond your trust (e.g. CDNs)

```
<script  
  src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery.min.js"  
  integrity="sha256-[hash] sha256-[hash2]"  
  crossorigin="anonymous"  
  fallback-src="jquery.min.js">  
</script>
```

- [caniuse.com/subresource-integrity](https://caniuse.com/subresource-integrity)

# SRI Fallback

Per the SRI Spec:

## NOTE

On a failed integrity check, an **error** event is fired. Developers wishing to provide a canonical fallback resource (e.g., a resource not served from a CDN, perhaps from a secondary, trusted, but slower source) can catch this **error** event and provide an appropriate handler to replace the failed resource with a different one.

...so we implemented it for you.

# SubResource Integrity

- Validate resources beyond your trust (e.g. CDNs)

```
<script  
  src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery.min.js"  
  integrity="sha256-[hash] sha256-[hash2]"  
  crossorigin="anonymous"  
  x-sri-fallback="jquery.min.js">  
</script>
```

- [caniuse.com/subresource-integrity](https://caniuse.com/subresource-integrity)

# BUILDER DEMO

[heisenberg.co/srifallbackdemo/](https://heisenberg.co/srifallbackdemo/)

Kneel to the demo gods



# SOURCE (Simplified BSD)


[github.com/cyph/sri-fallback](https://github.com/cyph/sri-fallback)

Do source gods even exist?

# CVE-2016-1636 Demo

[heisenberg.co/sridemo/sameorigin](http://heisenberg.co/sridemo/sameorigin)






## Content Security Policy: `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`

Test <script> src with valid hash

Test <script> src with invalid hash



## Content Security Policy: `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`

SWITCH

1640 x 941

Camera

Microphone

Settings

Help

FEATURES

STOP


Test `<script> src with valid hash`    Test `<script> src with invalid hash`

Elements Console Sources Network Timeline Profiles Resources Security Audits

<top frame>     Preserve log

Failed to find a valid digest in the 'integrity' attribute for resource 'https://heisenberg.co/srldemo/sameorigin/1.js' with computed SHA-256 integrity 'E9MS5ltHA6j7upFIYlZ5VW0AW82pciZoNF08RU0yu0g-'. The resource has been blocked. (index):1

**Content Security Policy:**  
`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`



Execution of remote code with hash  
BADHASH000= at  
7/25/2016, 4:51:43 PM was a success!

Test `<script> src with valid hash`    Test `<script> src with invalid hash`

# CSP Meta-Hardening

- Combines semi-strict header with strict `<meta>`.
- Allows for pre-loading of trusted complex logic.
- Does not work for the verbs `frame-ancestors`, `report-uri`, or `sandbox`.

# BUILDER DEMO

[heisenberg.co/metacspdemo/](https://heisenberg.co/metacspdemo/)

Fall on thy sword for the demo gods.

# Content Security Policy: `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`

Test inline code    Test non-inline code    Harden CSP via <meta> element



# Content Security Policy: `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`


Execution of inline code at  
7/25/2016, 4:59:46 PM was a success!

[Test inline code](#) [Test non-inline code](#) [Harden CSP via <meta> element](#)

Elements Sources **Console** Network Timeline Profiles Resources Security Audits

top  Preserve log

Filter  Regex  Hide network messages **All** Errors Warnings Info Logs Debug Handled



**Content Security Policy:**  
`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`

Execution of non-inline code at  
7/25/2016, 4:59:54 PM was a success!

Test inline code

Test non-inline code

Harden CSP via <meta> element

Elements Sources Console Network Timeline Profiles Resources Security Audits

top

Preserve log


Filter

Regexp  Hide network messages **All** Errors Warnings Info Logs Debug Handled

# Content Security Policy: `script-src 'self'`

Execution of non-inline code at  
7/25/2016, 4:59:54 PM was a success!

[Test inline code](#) [Test non-inline code](#) [Harden CSP via <meta> element](#)



# Content Security Policy: `script-src 'self'`

Execution of non-inline code at  
7/25/2016, 4:59:54 PM was a success!

Elements Sources **Console** Network Timeline Profiles Resources Security Audits

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2016-07-25 17:00:16.639  
▶ Refused to execute inline event handler because it violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "script-src 'self'". Either the 'unsafe-inline' keyword, a hash ('sha256-...'), or a nonce ('nonce-...') is required to enable inline execution. [\(index\):37](#)

# CSP Meta-Hardening

## Considerations

- *Static content only* in initial response!
- `X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block`

# CSP Meta-Hardening

- Best for adapting a semi-recent application for use with CSP.
- Application's trusted static logic is allowed to execute on initial load.
- Meta-Hardening prevents dynamic content from potentially executing later on.

# Http Public Key Pinning

- This can ~~break~~ brick sites. Use Reporting!
  - (Chrome 46+ only; no reporting in Firefox 😞)

Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:

```
max-age=5184000; includeSubdomains;  
pin-sha256="az9AwClWuHM+fYV+d8Cv9B4sAwdcoUqj93omk180/pc=";  
pin-sha256="5UONcYAsFtYscIIFlm4+aodoL20RRHzGa0eoSNEZ+iA=";  
report-uri="https://report-uri.io/report/[id]/reportOnly"
```

- [caniuse.com/hpkp](https://caniuse.com/hpkp)

# HPKP Suicide

*Deliberate self-bricking* via HPKP + Rapid Key Rotation.

Let's spend 20 minutes on how we can use this:


- ~~to enable in-browser code signing~~
- to control content changes and harden SRI.
- to enable nuanced web content blocking. (NetSec)
- to track users...
- to be total jerks...

...in ways we shouldn't put in print.

(Thanks Jann Horn @ Cure53 for putting us onto this!)



# HPKP Suicide



# HPKP Suicide for Builders

**Wait, in-browser code signing? No extensions?**

*In theory.*

In the last slide's content pinning scheme, code signing logic goes in the ServiceWorker.

This effectively gets us Trust On First Use for current and future code.

# HPKP Suicide for Builders

**Why “In theory”? This sounds like it should work.**

In fact, Cyph employs a mature, audited implementation of exactly this.

*However*, it was considered so novel that we had to apply for a patent on it.

But, you can come close to this for free if you...

# HPKP Suicide for Builders

## **Control local storage updates! Harden SRI!**

- Set HPKP max-age to count down to your deployment date.
- Rotate routinely.

# HPKP Suicide for Builders

## Benefits:

- Retain control of front-end content between releases.
- Mitigate risks of SRI hash tampering server-side.
- **Decent security and performance gains**

# HPKP Suicide for Builders

## Considerations:

- HPKP Suicide + SRI is a *design-time* decision!
  - Single Page Apps (SPAs) only
- Include mitigations such as halting distribution of HPKP headers if compromised.

# BUILDER DEMO

[redskins.io](https://redskins.io)

I don't believe in demo gods

# HPKP Suicide for Builders

## Web Content Gateway e.g. [SomeVendor]?

Lock your users out of sites even when they're not on your network!

1. For flagged domains, set HPKP headers.
2. Optionally, Rotate keys weekly at the gateway.

Done! (By us disclosing it, is this now prior art? 😊)



# HPKP Suicide for Builders

Oh... <https://crt.sh/?id=19538258>

Issuer:

commonName = VeriSign Class 3 Public  
Primary Certification  
Authority - G5

Subject:

commonName = **Blue Coat Public Services  
Intermediate CA**  
organizationalUnitName = Symantec Trust Network  
organizationName = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc."

**HPKP Suicide**  
**for Builders**

**User tracking?**

Well, we really shouldn't talk about this...

**HPKP Suicide**  
**for Builders**

But since this is DEF CON...

...let's track users!

# HPKP Suicide for Builders

Pre-requisites:

1. Lots of (sub)domains to pin
2. Browsers that allow HPKP incognito
3. Rapid Key Rotation



**Let's Encrypt**

(Thanks! 😊)

# HPKP SuperCookies

## Server-side

- `/set`: Returns HPKP header
- `/check`: No-op — no HPKP header, status code 200


## Client-side (JavaScript)

- **Set new ID:** Hit `/set` on random subset of domains
- **Check ID:** Hit `/check` on all domains; note failures

# BUILDER DEMO

[cyph.wang](https://cyph.wang)

I don't believe in demo gods



*Not* implemented by Google.  
We only ran the script in console.

# Google

Elements Sources **Console** Network Timeline Profiles Resources Security Audits

top  Preserve log  Show all messages

Filter  Regex  Hide network messages **All** Errors Warnings Info Logs Debug Handled

```
> HPKPSupercookie('cyph.wang').then(o => console.log(o))
```





```
> HPKPSupercookie('cyph.wang').then(o => console.log(o))  
< Promise {[[PromiseStatus]]: "pending", [[PromiseValue]]: undefined}  
2016-07-25 17:06:48.206 Object {id: 4565566, isNewUser: true} VM673:1  
> |
```

reddit: the front page of the internet

https://www.reddit.com

MY SUBREDDITS FRONT - ALL - RANDOM | ASKREDDIT - FUNNY - WORLDNEWS - VIDEOS - TODAYILEARNED - PICS - MOVIES - GIFS - NEWS - GAMING - AWW - SHOWERTHOUGHTS - IAMA - MILDLYINTERESTING - JOKES - TELEVISION - LIFEP MORE

reddit hot new rising controversial top gilded wiki promoted

Want to join? Log in or sign up in seconds. | English

ELI5: Why do some people wipe their nose when they're proud of something? Other

(self.explainlikeimfive) submitted 13 minutes ago by MrNodreams to /r/explainlikeimfive

comment share

what's this?

trending subreddits /r/marvelstudios /r/DontTellMom /r/DC\_Cinematic /r/EthereumClassic /r/robotwars 38 comments

1 11174 New York City just witnessed an absolutely massive lightning strike completely spanning the Hudson River. I happened to have my camera set up to capture it. (i.imgur.com)

submitted 5 hours ago by evoxlo to /r/pics

1786 comments share

Elements Sources Console Network Timeline Profiles Resources Security Audits

top Preserve log

Filter Regex Hide network messages All Errors Warnings Info Logs Debug Handled

*Not* implemented by Reddit.  
We only ran the script in console.

reddit hot new rising controversial top gilded wiki promoted

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comment share what's this?

search

username password

remember me reset password login

trending subreddits /r/marvelstudios /r/DontTellMom /r/DC\_Cinematic /r/EthereumClassic /r/robotwars 38 comments

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> HPKPSupercookie('cyph.wang').then(o => console.log(o))
```



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submitted 5 hours ago by evoxlo to /r/pics

search

username password

remember me reset password login



2016-07-26 01:18:19.513	▶ GET https://26.cyph.wang/check	net::ERR_INSECURE_RESPONSE	VM1762:1
2016-07-26 01:18:19.548	▶ GET https://30.cyph.wang/check	net::ERR_INSECURE_RESPONSE	VM1762:1
2016-07-26 01:18:19.576	▶ GET https://29.cyph.wang/check	net::ERR_INSECURE_RESPONSE	VM1762:1
2016-07-26 01:18:19.618	▶ GET https://15.cyph.wang/check	net::ERR_INSECURE_RESPONSE	VM1762:1
2016-07-26 01:18:19.626	▶ GET https://22.cyph.wang/check	net::ERR_INSECURE_RESPONSE	VM1762:1
2016-07-26 01:18:19.644	▶ GET https://18.cyph.wang/check	net::ERR_INSECURE_RESPONSE	VM1762:1
2016-07-26 01:18:19.652	▶ GET https://27.cyph.wang/check	net::ERR_INSECURE_RESPONSE	VM1762:1
2016-07-26 01:18:19.665	▶ GET https://28.cyph.wang/check	net::ERR_INSECURE_RESPONSE	VM1762:1
2016-07-26 01:18:19.675	▶ GET https://16.cyph.wang/check	net::ERR_INSECURE_RESPONSE	VM1762:1
2016-07-26 01:18:19.794	Object {id: 4565566, isNewUser: false}		VM1773:1

# HPKP SuperCookies

## Considerations:

Risk: DoSing tracker domains as a public service

1. Domain whitelist for your own tracker, or
2. App-issued and tracker-verified nonce if analytics is your business model.

The pattern described is similar to others here:

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-5>

# SOURCE (New BSD)

[github.com/cyph/hpkp-supercookie](https://github.com/cyph/hpkp-supercookie)

Do source gods even exist?

**HPKP Suicide**  
**for Builders**

**...to be total jerks?**

we *really* shouldn't talk about this...

HPKP Suicide  
for Breakers

Who are we kidding?  
This is DEF CON.



# HPKP Suicide for Breakers

Pre-requisites:

1. A high-traffic target
2. A way to shell the box
3. A free certificate authority




**Let's Encrypt**

(Sorry ☹)

HPKP Suicide

# RansomPKP

1. Determine target<sup>1</sup>
2. Generate ransom keypair (the recovery key)
3. Pwn<sup>2</sup> target webserver.
4. Generate new lockout keypair + CSR<sup>3</sup>
5. 
6. Profit!

# RansomPKP



While owned users  $< n$

1. "public-key-pins:  
max-age=31536000; includeSubdomains;  
pin-sha256= LOCKOUT\_KEY;  
pin-sha256= RANSOM\_KEY"

2. If owned users =  $n$ ,


1. Generate new lockout keypair + CSR<sup>3</sup>
2. Blow old lockout keypair. This locks out  $n$  users.
3.  $n = 0$

# Breaker Demo

[isis.io](http://isis.io)

"You tweachewous miscweant!"

-- Elmer Fudd





## Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **isis.io** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). `NET::ERR_SSL_PINNED_KEY_NOT_IN_CERT_CHAIN`

Automatically report details of possible security incidents to Google. [Privacy policy](#)

ADVANCED

Reload



HPKP Suicide

## RansomPKP

**Considerations** (i.e. why this is *not* a High):

1. Let's Encrypt rate limit: 20 certs weekly.
2. Chrome + Firefox have HPKP lockout mitigations
3. You still need to pop the box.

HPKP Suicide

# RansomPKP

## Programmatic Mitigations:



Chromium:

**WontFix**

Pre-Mitigated



Firefox:

**Match Chrome**

**HPKP Max Age**



Let's Encrypt:

**WontFix**

Out of Scope



HPKP Suicide

# RansomPKP

## *Partial* Host Mitigations

1. Use DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) – RFC 6844.
2. Use HPKP; monitor headers for changes.
3. Try not to get popped.

# RansomPKP

## End User Mitigations (Clearing key pins):

1. **Chrome:** `chrome://net-internals/#hsts`
2. ~~**Chrome:** `(alt): clear any browsing data.` "due to a curly brace mishap, we've been clearing it over-aggressively for years." (CVE-2016-1694)~~  
Clear your cache 😊
3. **Firefox:** `about:config >>`  
`security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level = 0,`  
visit site to take new header, re-enable.

# SOURCE (New BSD)

[github.com/cyph/ransompkp](https://github.com/cyph/ransompkp)

Do source gods even exist?

# Hat Tip

To Geller Bedoya, DigiCert, @el\_d33, Jonn Callahan, Jann Horn and all of Cure53, Samy Kamkar, Jim Manico, Mike McBryde, Jim Rennie and his superb legal skill, Garrett Robinson, John Wilander, Doug Wilson, as well as the Chrome, Firefox, and Let's Encrypt security teams for their contributions.

# github.com/cyph/appsec-glory

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Advisor/Mentor

**Mach37**

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@eganist

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